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DOES THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
TEST SURVIVE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS?
Cass R. Sunsteint
Under American regulatory law, the dominant contempo-
rary test involves cost-benefit analysis. The benefits of regula-
tion must justify the costs; if they do, regulation is permissible
and even mandatory. Under American free speech law, in
sharp contrast, an important contemporary test for the regula-
tion of speech involves "clear and present danger." In general,
officials cannot censor or regulate political speech on the
ground that the benefits of regulation justify the costs. They
may proceed only if the speech is likely to produce immtinent
lawless action. In principle, it is not simple to explain why the
free speech test does not involve cost-benefit analysis, as in-
deed both Judge Learned Hand and the Supreme Court in-
sisted that it should in the early 1950s. An initial explanation
points to the difficulty of quantifying both costs and benefits in
the context of speech. That is indeed a serious challenge, but
it does not justify the clear and present danger test, because
some form of cost-benefit balancing is possible on a more infor-
mal, intuitive basis. A second and more plausible explanation
points to the serious risk of institutional bias in any assess-
ment of the costs and benefits of speech. This explanation has
considerable force, but it rests on uncertain foundations, be-
cause institutional safeguards could be introduced to reduce
any such bias. The third and bestjustification of the clear and
present danger test is that in practice, it does not impose high
costs, because the speech that ends up being immunized from
regulation has not, in practice, turned out to be especially
harmful On this view, the benefits of the clear and present
danger test turn out to justify its costs, and the test is not
inferior to an approach that would allow regulation of political
speech f the benefits of regulation justifies the costs. From
1960 until 2001, this assessment was probably correct for the
United States, but fair questions can be raised about whether
it is correct today, especially in the context of recruitment to
commit terrorist acts, pro-terrorist speech, and certain kinds of
"fake news."
1775
t Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
I. THE COST-BENEFIT STATE ........................... 1776
A. Accounting .................................. 1777
B. Precautions and a Principle .................. 1778
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SPEECH ............... 1780
A. Speech and Conduct ........................ 1781
B. "More Speech, Not Enforced Silence"......... 1784
III. DEFENDING LIKELIHOOD AND IMMINENCE .............. 1789
A. Challenges of Quantification ................. 1790
B. Institutional Bias ............................ 1792
C. As It Happens ............................... 1794
CONCLUSION ........................................... 1796
"[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action."'
"[E]ach agency must ... propose or adopt a regulation only




Imagine that coal companies are emitting harmful pollu-
tants-particulate matter, greenhouse gases, ozone. Imagine,
too, that if public officials direct them to reduce their emis-
sions, they will face high costs, perhaps in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. Imagine that the benefits of emissions re-
ductions would be mostly felt in the future, in the form of
reductions in premature mortality in a decade or more, and a
small (but not zero) reduction in climate change. Finally, imag-
ine that the monetized benefits of emissions reductions, with
the appropriate discount rate, would dwarf the costs. On those
assumptions, is there any doubt that regulation would be a
good idea, even though the principal benefits would not be
enjoyed for years? (This is not meant to be a difficult question.
There is no such doubt.)
Now, suppose that the Department of Homeland Security
and the Federal Aviation Administration are considering a new
policy to reduce the risk of successful terrorist attacks at air-
ports. They are contemplating the use of a new security scan-
1 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
2 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
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ner that will (according to experts) prove effective in detecting
potential weapons, including small or novel kinds that ter-
rorists might use in the future.3 The economic cost of the new
scanner is high-at least $2 million for each. Federal officials
concede that they cannot say, with confidence, that the new
scanner will save lives; they cannot even say that it is more
likely than not to do so. But they believe that it will reduce the
risk of a successful terrorist attack. Would it be a mistake to
mandate the scanner? (This is meant to be a difficult question.
The answer is not obvious. But mandating the scanner would
not be a clear mistake.)
A. Accounting
The two cases just given are standard. Federal regulators
often act without the slightest hesitation even though the bene-
fits of their action will not be immediate; indeed, such benefits
might occur many years in the future (as in the case of climate
change).4 Federal regulators also act without much hesitation
when reasonable people think that the chance of producing
any benefits at all is under 50%. Consider, for example, regula-
tions designed to reduce the risk of a nuclear power accident
(improbable but potentially catastrophic) or another financial
crisis, for example by increasing capital and liquidity require-
ments. Of course, regulators will not impose costs for no bene-
fits. Instead they will think about the expected value of
regulatory requirements. If a mandate will have a 1 /X chance
of producing $500 million in benefits, it might be worth pro-
ceeding even if X is pretty big-and if the potential benefits are
(say) $5 billion, a chance of 1/20 would justify a quite costly
regulatory mandate.
The American regulatory state has become a cost-benefit
state,5 at least in many domains. In deciding whether to im-
pose regulatory controls, officials ask whether the benefits
would justify the costs, as mandated by Executive Order
3 Cf. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 760 F. Supp. 2d
4, 9-14 (D.D.C. 2011) (exploring procedural challenges to adoption of new screen-
Ing equipment).
4 INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, U.S. GOV'T, TECHNICAL
SUPPORT DOCuMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULA-
TORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER ExECuTIvE ORDER 12866, at 2-3 (2013), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/files/ omb/inforeg/social-cost of carbon for
_ria_2013_update.pdf [https: //perma.cc/FG7E-MSBV].
5 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 2 (2018); CASS R. SuN-
STEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE ix (2002). On the philosophical issues, see gener-
ally MATr-IEW ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION xiii (2012).
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13,563 and its predecessors.6 (It is true that some statutes
forbid executive branch officials from making cost-benefit anal-
ysis the rule of decision,7 but even when this is so, such offi-
cials are required by executive order to provide an accounting.)
Sometimes this inquiry presents difficult challenges because
quantification of various costs and benefits is difficult. Impor-
tantly, administrators have various tools for handling those
challenges.8
Whether or not those tools are sufficient, the most general
point is that in deciding whether to proceed, officials need not
be much moved by learning that the benefits would not be
imminent, or even that they are not likely to occur at all. The
question is the expected value of proceeding. A lack of immi-
nence suggests that the discount rate will greatly matter,9 and
of course a low probability of obtaining benefits must be recog-
nized, and it will drive the expected value way down. But these
are points about the magnitude of the benefits, which may
nonetheless be high, or at least high enough to justify
proceeding.
B. Precautions and a Principle
In the regulatory context, some people reject cost-benefit
balancing in favor of some kind of Precautionary Principle, call-
ing for regulation even when it cannot be said, with anything
like certainty, that precautions will actually eliminate harm. 10
On one view, the proponents of an activity face the burden of
proof. They must show that they are not threatening to harm
people, and until they meet that burden, they are forbidden
from engaging in risk-creating activity. Suppose, for example,
that new foods contain genetically modified organisms and that
genetically modified organisms may create risks to human
health and the environment. If so, many people would under-
stand the Precautionary Principle to ban the marketing of such
products.
6 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012). Distributive impacts,
equity, and human dignity may all be taken into account. Id
7 See generally Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-71
(2001) (ruling that a provision of the Clean Air Act forbids Executive Branch
officials from making a cost-benefit analysis the rule of decision, and noting that
the statute requires "an adequate margin of safety" in order to protect health).
8 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE 1-9 (2014).
9 For a vivid account, see FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS
179-81 (2004).
10 See id.; JALE TOSUN, RISK REGULATION IN EUROPE: ASSESSING THE APPLICATION OF
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 39 (2013).
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The Precautionary Principle plays a role in many nations,
and some version of it can be found in American law as well. 1 1
It is generally understood to be far more proregulatory than
cost-benefit balancing, and those who endorse it do so in part
for that reason. No nation has become a Precautionary State,
but there are good arguments for taking regulatory steps to
reduce uncertain or low-probability risks of harm, certainly if
those steps are not especially costly. 12
Particularly to those who favor cost-benefit balancing, the
Precautionary Principle is highly controversial, in part because
it seems to require steps that impose risks of their own-and
thus violate the Precautionary Principle. 1 3 If, for example, nu-
clear power plants are banned on precautionary grounds, na-
tions might have to rely on fossil fuels, which emit greenhouse
gases, and thus create serious risks. If foods with genetically
modified organisms are banned, more expensive foods or more
dangerous foods might be marketed instead. To the extent that
the Precautionary Principle forbids the very steps that it man-
dates, it is paralyzing, even incoherent, and cost-benefit analy-
sis is a preferable approach.
Some people endorse a more limited idea, the Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary Principle, which supports regulatory re-
strictions in cases in which catastrophic harm cannot be ruled
out. 14 The basic claim here is that even if a harm is highly
unlikely to occur, and even if it will not occur imminently,
sensible regulators might be willing to proceed. In certain cir-
cumstances, and depending on the costs, it might well make
sense to prevent low-probability risks of catastrophe. Airports
might be made more secure against the risk of terrorism even if
terrorist acts are unlikely. The same point might hold when it
11 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
12 See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE 185-207 (1983); DANIEL
STEEL, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 199-217 (2015); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 897 (2006). Elster, in
particular, emphasizes the problem of Knightian uncertainty, which means that it
is not possible to assign probabilities to various outcomes. In decision theory, it is
sometimes said that in the face of uncertainty, it is best to eliminate worst-case
scenarios. See generally Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14
J. POL. PHIL. 33, 33-34 (2006) (exploring when to rule out worst-case scenarios).
This view obviously has implications for speech-for example, when we cannot
know the probability that certain speech will produce serious harm.
13 See INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 3 (2001).
14 See Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (with Applica-
tion to the Genetic Modiftcation of Organisms) 3 (Sept. 4, 2014) (Extreme Risk




is not possible to specify the likelihood of terrorist acts. 1
5 With
respect to regulation in general, no one seriously questions the
claim that in some settings, officials should eliminate cata-
strophic risks, even when it cannot quantify their likelihood.
II
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SPEECH
Is speech different? How?
For purposes of analysis, I am going to use a broadly
welfarist framework, suggesting that we should focus on the
real-world consequences of various approaches. 16 If, for exam-
ple, an approach to free speech would seriously harm people's
capacity to learn about values or facts, it would be exceedingly
hard to defend. (Think: dictatorships. 17) If an approach to free
speech would allow significant numbers of people to be killed, it
would have a big strike against it. (Think: free speech absolu-
tism.) It should be readily acknowledged that welfarism raises
many questions and doubts. For one thing, it needs to be
specified; are we speaking of some form of utilitarianism, or
something more capacious?1 8 Perhaps more fundamentally, we
need to know what kinds of welfare losses count. Suppose that
certain forms of speech make people sad or mad. May they be
regulated for that reason? The standard forms of welfarism
must count sadness and anger as hedonic losses, but a system
of free speech could not stand as such if it did so as well. If
speech could be regulated whenever it made people sad or mad,
we would be regulating a lot of speech. (I am not going to count
sadness and anger as losses here.)
For those who reject welfarism and think that, for example,
a deontological approach to speech would be preferable, 19 my
focus will seem quite misplaced. Notwithstanding this point, I
believe that a broadly welfarist approach to free speech has
considerable appeal, and that we can make considerable pro-
gress on the clear and present danger test without running into
15 Cf. ELSTER, supra note 12, at 203-04 (discussing elimination of the worst
worst-case in circumstances of uncertainty, with reference to nuclear power).
16 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
(1982) (discussing the underlying issues).
17 See generally AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES (1981) (discussing dicta-
torships in the context of poverty and famines).
18 See Amartya Sen, Ulitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 463-64
(1979).
19 See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 204, 204 (1972).
[Vol. 104:17751780
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
murky philosophical waters.20 The proof, of course, lies in the
pudding.
A. Speech and Conduct
At least in principle, current thinking about costs and ben-
efits would seem to apply to speech no less than to conduct.
Suppose that we had a perfect technology for making predic-
tions about the probability that certain causes, including
speech, will produce certain effects. Suppose that the technol-
ogy demonstrates that a specified kind of speech-promoting,
say, terrorism-is more likely than not to produce serious
harm in the form of successful attacks, resulting in two thou-
sand deaths, not in a week or a month, but in two years, or five.
In that event, the clear and present danger test is not met,
because the danger is not imminent. Or suppose the technol-
ogy can show that the likelihood that speech will cause harm,
tomorrow, is just one in five-but that if the harm does occur, it
will be very grave (consisting, again, of two thousand deaths).
Again, the clear and present danger test is not met, because the
danger is not clear. In both cases, it would seem odd to say
that regulation is off-limits. At the very least, it would seem
odd to reach that conclusion without further inquiries.
Of course, a full evaluation would require attention to the
benefits of the speech, not only its costs. With respect to the
assessment of benefits, there are special challenges, perhaps
especially for speech that combats a tyrannical or unjust sta-
tus quo, and that promotes, purposefully or otherwise, violence
as a form of resistance. But we could easily imagine cases in
which the benefits of speech that has a high expected cost
would also be relatively low-so that the outcome of cost-bene-
fit analysis is not at all favorable to protecting such speech.
Suppose that in the two cases just given, the speech consists of
a wild, paranoid tract against the United States or the West,
calling for acts of violence. It seems safe to assume that the
benefits of protecting that speech do not justify thousands of
deaths.
In analyzing such problems, it is not necessary to use our
imaginations. Terrorist organizations are engaged in incite-
20 Note as well that even if one embraces a deontological approach to freedom
of speech, and believes that the right to speak freely has intrinsic value, one might
not be committed to any kind of free speech absolutism. If the consequences of
speech are bad enough, the right might be overridden. For those who accept that
conclusion, the analysis here will be relevant, even if a full-blown welfarist ap-
proach to freedom of speech is unappealing.
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ment and recruitment activities every day.2 1 Their initial
weapon is speech. On the internet and elsewhere, they call for
acts of murder and destruction. Let us simply stipulate that
however hateful, most or many of these statements cannot be
said to be more likely than not to produce imminent lawless
action. In such cases, there is no clear and present danger as
that phrase is generally understood. Instead, they create a
nonquantifiable risk that such action will occur at some point in
the unknown future. On standard regulatory principles, gov-
ernment may nonetheless be permitted to take action, at least
if the benefits of allowing the speech do not exceed the costs. (I
will turn to the question of benefits in due course.)
The case of terrorism may be unique, but the analysis can
be extended to an assortment of problems, some relatively new
(at least in their prominence) and some on the horizon. Con-
sider efforts, by foreign agents or by Americans, to disseminate
"fake news" so as to skew elections or to foment social dis-
cord.22 We could readily imagine that the dissemination of
such "news" cannot be shown to present a clear and present
danger. But is it so clear that efforts to skew electoral out-
comes, by the spreading of knowing falsehoods, should be pro-
tected by the First Amendment? Is it so clear that some kind of
balancing is not in order?
23
Such balancing is hardly foreign to free speech law. In-
deed, a kind of cost-benefit balancing played a crucial role in
Dennis v. United States,2 4 a decision that is generally treated as
a dinosaur, or an object of ridicule, in constitutional law cir-
cles. The case involved an alleged conspiracy by members of
the Communist Party hoping to overthrow the U.S. govern-
ment. The Court said that it was "squarely presented with the
application of the 'clear and present danger' test, and must
decide what that phrase imports."25 In that sense, the Court
21 See MARC SAGEMAN, IISUNDERSTANDING TERRORISM 89-92 (2017).
22 A valuable discussion is found in Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social
Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 219-31 (2017).
23 I am bracketing two intriguing questions: (1) whether and when foreign
agents, and those who might listen to them, have free speech interests and (2)
whether and when false statements of fact are protected by the First Amendment.
On the first question, see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972)
(holding that would-be listeners to foreigners, outside the United States, can
claim a degree of First Amendment protection, subject to congressional override).
On the second question, see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies,
Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1435, 1437-40 (2015).
24 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951).
25 Id. at 508.
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purported to apply rather than to reject that test. The Court
explained:
Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Govern-
ment may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited.
If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow
is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit
them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders
feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is
required.... Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Govern-
ment by force, even though doomed from the outset because
of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a
sufficient evil for Congress to prevent. The damage which
such attempts create both physically and politically to a na-
tion makes it impossible to measure the validity in terms of
the probability of success, or the immediacy of a successful
attempt.26
At that point, the Court referred to Judge Learned Hand's
formulation for the court below, a form of cost-benefit balanc-
ing in accordance with which, "[iln each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid
the danger."27 The Court adopted this standard as its own, on
the ground that it "takes into consideration those factors which
we deem relevant, and relates their significances. More we can-
not expect from words."28
Not coincidentally, Judge Hand's free speech formula is
similar to the famous Hand formula for negligence, celebrated
in (and actually helping to spur) the economic analysis of law.
Judge Hand's negligence standard calls for cost-benefit
analysis:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from
her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace
to those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar
situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function
of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break
away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the
burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring
this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
26 Ia& at 509.
27 Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.




liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B less than PL.
2 9
For speech, Judge Hand was singing the song of contempo-
rary American regulators, and in Dennis, the Court embraced
the idea as a rendering of the clear and present danger test.
But today, almost no one likes that idea.30 Why not?
B. "More Speech, Not Enforced Silence"
1. Counterspeech. In their great free speech opinions, Jus-
tices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis Brandeis emphati-
cally rejected cost-benefit balancing. Brandeis offered the most
elaborate explanation. In his view, "[olnly an emergency can
justify repression."3 1 That conclusion undergirded his own un-
derstanding of the clear and present danger test, which (con-
trary to Dennis and Judge Hand) required a showing of
imminence. In his account, "no danger flowing from speech
can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the
evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there
is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence."3 2 As he put it, that is "the com-
mand of the Constitution," and it "must be the rule if authority
is to be reconciled with freedom."
33
Some of this is mere rhetoric on Justice Brandeis' part.
The imminence requirement is not clearly "the command of the
Constitution."3 4 There are plenty of ways to reconcile authority
with freedom, and the clear and present danger test is merely
one. The Dennis approach may or may not be under-protective
of speech, depending on how we understand the optimal level
of protection, but it is surely an effort at reconciling authority
and freedom. Perhaps it is not the best one. At one point,
Judge Learned Hand himself offered a radically different route,
one with great contemporary relevance in light of the rise of
terrorism. In his view, the free speech principle does not pro-
29 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d. Cir. 1947).
30 On the need for the word "almost," see the qualified defense of Dennis in
Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1, 8-36 (1986).
31 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 See generally Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127
YALE L.J. 246, 264-94 (2017) (demonstrating that the First Amendment was not
originally understood to include the clear and present danger test).
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tect explicit or direct incitement to violence, even if no harm is
imminent.3 5 If you are merely agitating for change, the govern-
ment cannot proceed against you, but if you are expressly incit-
ing people to commit murder, you are no longer protected by
the Constitution. What matters is what you are saying, not
whether it will have bad effects. Judge Hand greatly preferred
his approach to the clear and present danger test, which he
thought squishy and susceptible to biased assessments by fed-
eral judges. As he wrote:
I am not wholly in love with Holmesy's test and the reason is
this. Once you admit that the matter is one of degree, while
you may put it where it genuinely belongs, you so obviously
make it a matter of administration, i.e. you give to Tomdick-
andharry, D.J., so much latitude ... that the jig is at once
up. Besides even their Ineffabilities, the Nine Elder States-
men, have not shown themselves wholly immune from the
'herd instinct' and what seems 'immediate and direct' to-day
may seem very remote next year even though the circum-
stances surrounding the utterance be unchanged.
3 6
Of course, cost-benefit analysis has been criticized on simi-
lar grounds,37 though modern economic strategies can greatly
reduce the problem.3 8 By contrast, Judge Hand defended his
exemption of incitement as a "qualitative formula, hard, con-
ventional, difficult to evade."3 9 Judge Hand's test would of
course allow punishment of terrorist speech if and to the extent
that it qualifies as incitement. (Note that Judge Hand's pre-
ferred test was hardly a cost-benefit test of the sort that he later
embraced as a lower court judge in Dennis, because it embod-
ied a categorical distinction; he preferred it in part for that
reason, a point to which I will return.)
Whether or not it is right to exclude incitement, as Judge
Hand understood it, from the protection afforded by the First
Amendment, Justice Brandeis' approach cannot simply be
read off the Constitution, and we cannot see the Dennis ap-
proach as necessarily or inherently incompatible with it. To be
sure, the First Amendment protects "the freedom of speech,"
35 See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd,
246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
36 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 749 (1975) (quoting
Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921)).
37 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEo L.J.
2341, 2341-42 (2002).
38 For general discussion, see W. KIP VISCUSI, PRICING LIVES (2018).
39 Gunther, supra note 36, at 749 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921)).
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but you can embrace that form of freedom while agreeing or
even insisting that on a certain showing of harm, regulation or
subsequent punishment is acceptable.40 Justice Brandeis'
judgment on behalf of his understanding of the Constitution's
command depends on arguments of his own, not a mere an-
nouncement of the inevitable meaning of the First Amendment.
2. Imminence. Of course, Justice Brandeis does offer an
argument, and it is an exceedingly famous one to boot. The
argument is essentially a defense of the imminence require-
ment: if there is time to avert the evil through discussion, then
the remedy is not forced silence, but counterspeech. Instead of
censoring speech or threatening to punish it, the government
should attempt to rebut it. If people call for overthrow of the
government, or claim that women should be subordinate to
men, or attack racial minority groups, their arguments should
be answered on the merits. For reasons elaborated by John
Stuart Mill, 4 1 that process of rebuttal has numerous advan-
tages: it corrects error, opens up new possibilities, sharpens
thought even when it does not change it, undoes complacency,
and helps societies to move in the direction of truth.
These are appealing ideas, but on reflection, they are a bit
of a mess, certainly as a defense of the clear and present dan-
ger test in genuinely hard cases. Suppose that a speaker is
saying something that is 49% likely to result in the death of
5,000 children, not imminently but in the next two years.
Should the speaker be allowed to impose that risk? Or to
sharpen the objection to Justice Brandeis, suppose that the
probability of those 5,000 deaths is 99.99%, again not immi-
nently but in the next two years. Why is imminence necessary?
By emphasizing the potential value of discussion, Justice
Brandeis is fighting the hypothetical. He is assuming or stipu-
lating that because there is no emergency, speech can provide
the remedy. Maybe so, but that is simply a way of denying the
predicate of the question, which seems to deserve a real
answer.
The regulatory analogy is helpful here. In the domain of
regulation, the fact that a harm is not "present," in the sense of
likely to occur imminently, is hardly a sufficient reason not to
engage in regulation. No one contends that inminence should
be a precondition for regulation. If a lack of imminence is not a
sufficient reason to stop regulation in general, the question
40 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 34, at 264-94, for evidence.
41 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1985).
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remains: why is it a sufficient reason to stop regulation of
speech?
It is true that with respect to Justice Brandeis' central
concerns, speech may be unique; for (say) pollution, the harm
that regulators seek to address is unlikely to be addressable
(merely) through discussion, if only because we are not dealing
with speech but action. If a company is planning to emit high
levels of fine particulate matter in the next year, it would be
puzzling to insist that the right response is more speech. To be
sure, people could say to polluters, "Stop polluting" But under
plausible assumptions, that is not likely to be enough. Moral
suasion can certainly help, but to stop environmental harm, we
usually need action as well.
But to tighten the analogy with harmful speech, we might
point out that environmental harm might well be addressable
through some other means, short of immediately regulating the
underlying conduct. Regulators might want to adopt a strategy
of "wait, then act." If the harm is premature mortality or cli-
mate change, a less-than-imminent harm might well turn out
to be preventable at some point before it actually occurs. For
climate change in particular, adaptation, or some unforeseen
technological fix, might prevent the harm in (say) 2040. That
possibility raises a fair question, often offered by objects of
regulation: why should we impose expensive precautions to-
day? Whenever the issue involves health and safety, it is possi-
ble to think that interim steps will prevent the feared harms
from coming to fruition. Would it not be better to delay costly
measures until tomorrow, or the day after?
Possibly SO,4 2 but often not. The best answer, of course, is
suggested in Dennis itself: if we do not act now, action might
turn out to be too expensive or too late.43 An ounce of preven-
tion might well be worth a pound of cure. Regulators should
certainly consider the question of timing and the possibility
that the harm can be averted through other means, but there is
no reason to foreclose regulatory action merely because the
harm is not imminent. As always, the relevant numbers are
critical to the analysis; if the probability of averting the harm is
50%, the benefits should be discounted accordingly, while also
taking into consideration the costs of the steps that would avert
the harm. A complete analysis would consider the full set of
42 See the discussion of precautions and delay in Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversi-
ble and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 864-65 (2006).




costs and benefits, with reference to the appropriate discount
rate and estimates of all relevant probabilities. But (and this is
the central point) it would hardly lead to Justice Brandeis'
insistence on imminence.
The upshot is that the imminence requirement is difficult
indeed to defend, unless it is a rough-and-ready way to instan-
tiate the idea that the harm must be likely. Justice Brandeis
might be thinking that if the harm is not imminent, it is simply
too speculative to say that it is likely, and that harms that are
not imminent are unlikely to come to fruition so long as discus-
sion is available. It would be lovely to think so. But it is not
true; harms that are not imminent often come to fruition, and
sometimes they are likely to do so.
3. Likelihood. So much for the imminence requirement.
What about the idea that harms must be likely, taken by itself?
We could imagine a free speech regime that requires a showing
of likelihood but that says nothing at all about imminence: a
high likelihood ten years hence is the same as a high likelihood
tomorrow-but a high likelihood is what is required. As in the
regulatory context, however, this is a puzzling view. A 10% risk
of catastrophe may deserve more attention than a 55% risk of
modest harm; at least as a first approximation, expected value
is what matters.44 What is so magical about a probability of
more than 50%? Why should that be the threshold?
At its origin, the idea of a "clear" danger almost certainly
meant something far more modest, now lost to history. When
Justice Holmes first announced the clear and present danger
test, he did not intend anything especially speech-protective.
45
And when he used the word "clear," he might well have meant
not "more likely than not," but something more akin to "real
rather than fanciful." On that view, the word "clear" was in-
tended to clarify the word "danger" in a modest way, by signal-
ing the simple fact that the government must actually be able
to point to one. That would bring free speech law closely into
line with regulatory standard, where fanciful risks also cannot
be regulated (because regulation would fail cost-benefit balanc-
ing); and, of course, such a test would be a far cry from current
law.
As a matter of current understandings, however, this point
is moot. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court read "clear" to
44 If people are risk-seeking or risk-averse, of course, it might not be sufficient
to consider expected value alone.
45 See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT 92-104 (2013).
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mean "likely."4 6 That interpretation has been unchallenged for
decades. What I am suggesting thus far is that the unchal-
lenged interpretation seems very hard to defend, because cost-
benefit balancing is better. Indeed, the difficulty of defending it
becomes only clearer when we expand the viewscreen. In regu-
lation, as noted, the expected value of the harm is only one part
of the picture; the benefit of the underlying activity matters as
well. We might be dealing with socially beneficial activity, and
it might cost (say) $900 million to regulate it, or we might be
dealing with activity from which society does not much benefit,
and it might cost $1 million to regulate it. It much matters
whether we are dealing with highly beneficial activity or not.
Should not the same be true for speech? And once we start
thinking in terms of both benefits and costs, we will be refining
the framework in Dennis, in a way that makes that framework
compatible with regulatory approaches more broadly. In the
cost-benefit state, why would that be a mistake?
III
DEFENDING LIKELIHOOD AND IMMINENCE
I now turn to three possible defenses of the clear and pre-
sent danger test, taking them in ascending order of persuasive-
ness. The first is that in light of the insuperable difficulties of
quantification, cost-benefit analysis is not feasible in this do-
main. The second points to the pervasive risk of institutional
bias, arguing that the clear and present danger test is a sec-
ond-best, designed to counteract that bias. On that view, the
test is actually what cost-benefit analysis calls for, because it
responds to the danger of inaccurate case-by-case assess-
ments. This would be in the nature of a rule-consequentialist
defense of the clear and present danger test.4 7 The third, and
the most convincing, justification is that in the real world, the
cases for which the clear and present danger test fails did not
exist in the last half of the twentieth century, or at least could
not easily be identified if they did exist. If the second and the
third justifications are put together, the clear and present dan-
ger test looks pretty good.
A reasonable conclusion is that the clear and present dan-
ger test is not easy to defend in principle or in the abstract. But
the difference from the more general regulatory context is that
it is hard to list real-world situations in which speech should be
46 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
47 See BRAD HOOKER, IDEAL CODE, REAL WORLD: A RULE-CONSEQUENTIALIST ThE-
ORY OF MORALITY (2003).
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regulated because it produces nonimminent, low-probability
harms. Because of the rise of terrorism, fake news, and related
threats, however, the first half of the twenty-first century might
be different from the second half of the twentieth on that count.
A. Challenges of Quantification
In the world of regulation, it is often possible to quantify
both costs and benefits. For example, an energy efficiency reg-
ulation might be anticipated to cost $200 million per year. It
might save consumers $400 million per year and also reduce
air pollution by specified amounts, with monetizable effects. If
so, the aggregate benefits are far higher than the aggregate
costs. Analysis of this kind is standard for federal regulations.
The whole exercise is far more challenging for speech, and
in some ways, it is neither feasible nor attractive. Suppose that
a speaker is calling for violent acts to resist what he sees as
oppression. Suppose that the acts will result in some number
of deaths. We might enlist the usual number of the value of a
statistical life, which is in the general vicinity of $9 million,48
and multiply that by the number of lives at risk, discounted by
the probability that the bad outcome will occur. But there are
multiple uncertainties here. How many lives are at risk? Is $9
million the correct number in this particular context? What is
the probability? Perhaps analysts can produce lower or upper
bounds, which might make the analysis more tractable. But
the guesswork here is substantial.
Valuation of the benefits of speech is even more difficult.
Suppose that we are dealing with pro-Communist speech, ra-
cial hate speech, Nazi marches, terrorist recruitment, celebra-
tion of terrorist attacks, fake news of some kind, or calls for
overthrow of a government. What is the benefit of that speech?
Can we quantify it?
One way to answer that question would require us to probe
some deep questions. We might protect speech because it pro-
tects autonomy; because it serves the goal of arriving at truth;
because it is a safety valve; because it is indispensable to self-
government; or because it promotes social welfare.49 These are
of course among the largest issues in free speech theory. Even
48 See Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Transp., Guidance on Treatment of
the Economic Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) in U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion Analyses-2015 Adjustment (June 17, 2015), https://www.transportation
.gov/sites/dot.gov/flles/docs/VSL2015_0.pdf [https: //perma.cc/7RZT-65RS]
(setting value of statistical life for 2015 at $9.4 million).
49 For an instructive overview, see SCHAUER, supra note 16.
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if we believe that one of these things is true, or that all of them
are true, we will not have made much progress toward valuing
benefits. If we are serious about costs and benefits, the valua-
tion exercise requires quantification. For pollution reduction,
it is usual to begin by asking about the real-world effects (re-
duced mortality, reduced morbidity), and then to quantify them
(500 premature deaths averted, 2,000 nonfatal cancer cases
averted), and then to turn them into monetary equivalents
(usually with resort to the idea of people's willingness to pay). 50
For speech, steps of that kind are both difficult and (to put it
mildly) not self-evidently attractive.
To value speech, we would hardly want to rest content with
asking speakers how much they would be willing to pay to
retain their right to say what they want (or how much they
would demand to give up that right). That would be patently
inadequate, a kind of category mistake. The value of the right
to speak out or to take part in a political protest-say, by peo-
ple objecting to police brutality or the practice of abortion-is
not properly measured by asking speakers how much they
would pay for it. One reason is that even if the answers to such
questions are in some important sense relevant, the value of
speech is not captured by its value to speakers; the audience
matters as well, and it is probably what matters most. On one
view, free speech is for listeners even more than speakers.5 1
To assess the value of speech to listeners, would it make
sense to ask (a random sample of?) people how much they
would be willing to pay to hear certain speeches? To ensure
that certain speakers are allowed to speak? In a nation that
values freedom, those are terrible questions. One reason is
that speech is supposed to affect, and not simply to track,
people's values and preferences. Economic analysis of willing-
ness-to-pay does not adequately capture what matters. (Of
course, some people think that the same is true for pollution,5 2
but at least the theoretical justification is well-developed in
that context.) Another reason is that people's judgments about
the value of speech may well depend on whether it pleases
them, which would produce a distorted assessment of the ben-
efits of speech; whether speech is valuable does not depend on
whether it pleases people.
50 See SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION, supra note 5, at 39-66.
51 See AMARTiYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000).
52 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerllng, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553-56 (2002).
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For these reasons, the usual approach to valuing costs and
benefits fails in this context. It presents insuperable empirical
problems, and even if these could be surmounted, there are
serious normative objections to using that approach. But what
is the implication of these conclusions? Dennis did not purport
to use economic analysis of any formal kind; it endorsed some-
thing far looser and more intuitive, designed to specify or soften
the clear and present danger test in circumstances in which
the danger was neither clear nor present. The basic idea is that
if speech has a positive probability of causing or contributing to
egregious harm, government is not powerless to prevent it. We
can take this idea as a form of rough-and-ready cost-benefit
analysis or as a version of the Catastrophic Harm Precaution-
ary Principle. And indeed, it can be read as either. The basic
point is that the difficulty of quantifying costs and benefits is
neither a convincing objection to the Dennis approach nor an
adequate defense of the clear and present danger test.
B. Institutional Bias
An alternative view is that the clear and present danger
test is an excellent response to a pervasive institutional risk,
which is that the government's own assessments will be sys-
tematically skewed, above all because its own self-interest, and
the interests of powerful private groups, are so often at stake.
The risk, in other words, is that while invoking the prospect of
harm and speaking of expected value, public officials are actu-
ally trying to insulate themselves from criticism. Their real
concerns are about protecting their own power and legitimacy,
rather than protecting the society from danger. Our own his-
tory speaks volumes here.5 3 Internationally, one can readily
think of examples from Russia, China, Cuba, and Turkey.
Suppose, for example, that some protesters, objecting to
what they see as racist violence by the police, demonstrate
noisily in a large city, or that other protesters, skeptical of what
they see as an overreaching national government, are vigor-
ously objecting to recent legislation. Public officials might com-
plain about a risk of violence, but their actual goal (whether
conscious or not) might be to insulate themselves from criti-
cism. Their interest in precautions, and their assessment of
costs and benefits, will be systematically self-serving-an un-
reliable and even dangerous basis for authorizing action. Any
53 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
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Precautionary Principle, with respect to the harms stemming
from speech, would put democracy itself at immediate and se-
vere risk.
Cost-benefit analysis might seem much better, but it suf-
fers from precisely the same vice, which is that it enables un-
trustworthy officials to invoke a seemingly neutral and
abstractly appealing standard in defense of outcomes that ac-
tually violate that very standard. On welfarist grounds and in
principle, the clear and present danger test might not be close
to perfect. But in the real world, it is incalculably (so to speak)
preferable to what would emerge from open-ended balancing by
unreliable balancers. In short, it considers the risk of manipu-
lation and biased judgment by those actually charged with as-
sessing the costs and benefits. It has a rule-consequentialist
justification, even if it misfires in some cases.
In the regulatory context, a similar argument is not unfa-
miliar. A standard claim, especially within the business com-
munity, is that government regulators typically overstate the
benefits and understate the costs of what they do.54 Whether
or not that is true, the proper response, if it is indeed true, is to
put in place institutional safeguards that correct mistaken
judgments.55 We might, for example, allow assessment by
some kind of independent entity within the executive branch,
or insist on judicial review of the agency's analysis. As in the
context of regulation in general, so in the free speech context:
the most natural response to institutional bias is to create safe-
guards to combat it.
Federal judges need not defer to whatever legislative and
executive officials think; they could force them to meet a (high)
burden of proof. On this approach, some version of the Dennis
test would be firmly in place, but with strong judicial efforts to
reduce the risk of bias. Other institutional safeguards might be
put in place to reduce that risk, in the form of independent
analysts within the legislative or executive branches, whose job
would be to monitor the assessment of both costs and benefits.
It is true that without a clear and present danger test, the very
prospect of a prosecution or lawsuit, with its burdens and
costs, might impose a large chilling effect on speech, even if
54 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GovERNMENT 173-89 (2013).
55 See Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experi-
mentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 118-22 (David Moss





independent actors would ultimately be available to reduce the
danger of bias. That is an important point. But it is hardly
clear that it is sufficient to justify allowing speech that would
impose a risk of creating serious or even catastrophic harm.
The upshot is that the risk of institutional bias is signifi-
cant and entirely real, but the more direct corrective is not to
jump from a cost-benefit test to a clear and present danger test,
but to increase the likelihood that the proper test will be prop-
erly applied. The institutional defense of the clear and present
danger test is forceful but incomplete. It identifies the right
ailment, but it does not offer the most obvious cure. The ques-
tion is whether that cure is available. The most that can be
said is that if the right cure is unavailable, the clear and pre-
sent danger test might be a second-best-but the institutional
defense cannot, on its own, produce a full-scale justification of
that test.
C. As It Happens
Here is a final argument on behalf of the clear and present
danger test. In my view, it is basically convincing-or at least it
has been convincing for most of the period in which the test has
held sway. The problem is that it depends on empirical as-
sumptions that will not always hold, and that probably do not
hold today.
The central claim is that in the world in which we have
lived and perhaps continue to live, the cases that confound the
clear and present danger test arise rarely or not at all. I have
pointed to situations in which harm is neither likely nor imi-
nent, as when speech causes a 1 /x risk of harm in a distant
future. But the stubborn fact is that in such cases, the costs of
allowing the speech have turned out to be low (in reality), and
those costs can be avoided or minimized without restricting
speech-as, for example, with counterspeech and by taking
strong (and not unduly costly) steps to avert violence.
Suppose, for example, that a number of people call for
violent acts in circumstances in which the clear and present
danger test is not satisfied-to overthrow the government, to
kill police officers, to have some kind of revolution. If such calls
in fact produce violent acts that could not be prevented through
other means, then the argument for speech regulation would
be difficult to avoid. The clear and present danger test would
be responsible for tragedy. But (the argument goes) there are
essentially no such cases.
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On this count, the regulatory context is altogether differ-
ent. It is easy to find many cases in which regulation is impor-
tant or even critical to prevent harms even if they would not
occur imminently.56 For situations of low-probability risks, it
is more difficult to find many examples, but it is plausible to
think that in the context of nuclear power and financial stabil-
ity, numerous actions have been justified and desirable even if
the harms were not "likely." A clear and present danger test
would make no sense for regulation in general; it would impose
intolerably high net costs. The same cannot be said in the
context of speech. And that is, in a nutshell, the central de-
fense of the clear and present danger test.
We would need a lot of detail to know for sure, but for the
decades in which the clear and present danger test has held
sway, this defense is plausibly convincing. Defenders of Dennis
would be hard-pressed to point to situations in which their
preferred approach would have prevented serious harm. To be
sure, everything depends on assumptions about the state of
the world. With certain assumptions in place, defenders of
Dennis might be able to undertake that task. And even if they
could not, we could easily imagine a nation, facing a high de-
gree of volatility and serious risks of speech-induced violence,
in which the argument for something like the Dennis approach
would be quite strong. (From the standpoint of the British,
would that have been the situation in the American colonies in
the years immediately preceding the American Revolution? Is
that the situation of many nations now?) And in an era of
international terrorism and fake news, the argument for some-
thing like Dennis might well be stronger. At the very least,
reasonable people might think so.
Is it? To some extent, that is an empirical question. To put
the issue in sharp relief, suppose that within the next (say) ten
years, there is a significant chance (say, 45%) of two or more
serious terrorist attacks in the United States, each producing a
loss of 2,000 or more lives, with proliferating harms of high
magnitude. Suppose, too, that if relevant terrorist recruitment
speech is banned,57 both of those attacks would be prevented.
If so, the cost-benefit calculus might well come out favorably to
regulation-and the Dennis approach might well be better. At
56 One example is depletion of the ozone layer. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of
Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 1, 1-9 (2007).
57 I am bracketing the question whether the speakers are inside the United




least this is so if we believe (as I do) that the benefits of terrorist
recruitment speech are essentially zero.
I do not mean to press any empirical claims here. But with
this sketch of the best arguments for the clear and present
danger test, we can see that under imaginable assumptions, it
would have unacceptably high net costs. If the risk of institu-
tional bias could be cabined, and if the test would allow horrify-
ing acts to occur, then Dennis would be better. It is hard to say
that the clear and present danger test has caused a great deal
of mischief over the last fifty years. But it is not implausible to
say that it will cause mischief over the next fifty years. In the
context of terrorism and certain kinds of "fake news," whether
that possibility justifies something more like Dennis, or per-
haps akin to Judge Hand's incitement test, is at least a ques-
tion worth asking.
CONCLUSION
The modern regulatory state uses cost-benefit analysis as
its standard rule of decision, and it would not make much
sense to say that the regulatory choices of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Department of Transportation, and the
Department of Health and Human Services should be based
instead on the clear and present danger test. Reasonable peo-
ple have contended that cost-benefit analysis fails to take suffi-
cient precautions against risks; almost no reasonable person
argues that such balancing generally produces excessive regu-
lation (even if it might do so in particular cases).
In principle, some form of cost-benefit balancing might well
seem preferable to the clear and present danger test in the
context of speech as well. A natural objection involves valua-
tion: What, exactly, are the costs and the benefits of speech
that (say) calls for some kind of political revolution? That is an
excellent question, but at least in some cases, it is unnecessary
to resolve difficult questions of valuation in order to say that
the balance comes out unfavorably to speech, even though no
danger is clear and present.
The best justifications for the clear and present danger test
point to institutional biases and to the possibility that the
cases that confound that test are not likely to arise in the real
world. It need not be emphasized that public officials will often
find a danger even when there is no such thing; their own
desire for self-insulation will distort their judgments. It is true
that institutional safeguards could reduce or perhaps eliminate
this problem, which makes it important to contend that as
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opposed to the clear and present danger test, Dennis responds
to a generally nonexistent problem, or a problem that is best
handled not through censorship, but with counterspeech and
law enforcement.
In the United States from the period between 1960 and
2001, that conclusion seems right. But it is less obviously
right today. The clear and present danger test is not a test for
all seasons. In imaginable times and places, it rests on uncer-
tain assumptions. Even in the face of international terrorism
and the dissemination of "fake news" by foreign governments
and others who seek to disrupt democratic processes,58 it
would be reckless to say that we would be better off without
that test. But it is not reckless to say that that is a perfectly fair
question to ask.
58 See supra text accompanying note 23.
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